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We propose a quantum secret sharing protocol between multi-party (m members in group 1) and
multi-party (n members in group 2) using a sequence of single photons. These single photons are
used directly to encode classical information in a quantum secret sharing process. In this protocol, all
members in group 1 directly encode their respective keys on the states of single photons via unitary
operations, then the last one (the mth member of group 1) sends 1/n of the resulting qubits to each
of group 2. Thus the secret message shared by all members of group 1 is shared by all members of
group 2 in such a way that no subset of each group is efficient to read the secret message, but the
entire set (not only group 1 but also group 2) is. We also show that it is unconditionally secure.
This protocol is feasible with present-day techniques.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose two groups such as two government depart-
ments, where there are m and n members respectively,
want to correspond with each other, but members of each
group do not trust each other. What can they do? Clas-
sical cryptography gives an answer which is known as
secret sharing [1]. It can be used, to guarantee that no
single person or part of each department can read out
the secret message, but all members of each group can.
This means that for security to be breached, all peo-
ple of one group must act in concert, thereby making it
more difficult for any single person who wants to gain
illegal access to the secret information. It can be im-
plemented as follows: from his original message, every
person ( called sender) of group 1 separately creates n
coded messages and sends each of them to each mem-
ber (called receiver) of group 2. Each of the encrypted
message contains no information about senders’ original
message, but the combination of all coded messages con-
tains the complete message of group 1. However, either
a (m + n + 1)-th party (an ”external” eavesdropper) or
the dishonest member of two groups who can gain ac-
cess to all senders’ transmissions can learn the contents
of their (all senders) message in this classical procedure.
Fortunately, quantum secret sharing protocols [2, 3, 4, 5]
can accomplish distributing information securely where
multi-photon entanglement is employed. Recently, many
kinds quantum secret sharing with entanglement have
been proposed [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Lance et al. have reported
an experimental demonstration of a (2,3) threshold quan-
tum secret sharing scheme [11]. The combination of
quantum key distribution (QKD) and classical sharing
protocol can realize secret sharing safely. Quantum se-
cret sharing protocol provides for secure secret sharing by
enabling one to determine whether an eavesdropper has
been active during the secret sharing procedure. But it
is not easy to implement such multi-party secret sharing
tasks [2, 6], since the efficiency of preparing even tripar-
tite or four-partite entangled states is very low [12, 13],
at the same time the efficiency of the existing quantum
secret sharing protocols using quantum entanglement can
only approach 50%.
More recently, a protocol for quantum secret sharing
without entanglement has been proposed by Guo and
Guo [14]. They present an idea to directly encode the
qubit of quantum key distribution and accomplish one
splitting a message into many parts to achieve multi-
party secret sharing only by product states. The theoret-
ical efficiency is doubled to approach 100%. Bra´dler and
Dusˇek have given two protocols for secret-information
splitting among many participants [15].
In this paper, we propose a quantum secret sharing
scheme employing single qubits to achieve the aim men-
tioned above — the secret sharing between multi-party
(m parties of group 1) and multi-party (n parties of group
2). That is, instead of giving his information to any one
individual of group 1, each sender to split his informa-
tion in such a way that no part members of group 1 or
group 2 have any knowledge of the combination of all
senders (group 1), but all members of each group can
jointly determine the combination of all senders (group
1). The security of our scheme is based on the quantum
no-cloning theory just as the BB84 quantum key distri-
bution. Comparing with the efficiency 50% limiting for
the existing quantum secret sharing protocols with quan-
tum entanglement, the present scheme can also be 100%
efficient in principle.
2II. QUANTUM KEY SHARING BETWEEN
MULTI-PARTY AND MULTI-PARTY
Suppose there are m (m ≥ 2) and n (n ≥ 2) mem-
bers in government department1 and department2, re-
spectively, and Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicem, and Bob1,
Bob2, · · · , Bobn are their respective all members. m
parties of department1 want quantum key sharing with
n parties of department2 such that neither one nor part
of each department knows the key, but only by all mem-
bers’ working together can each department determine
what the string (key) is. In this case it is the quantum
information that has been split into n pieces, no one of
which separately contains the original information, but
whose combination does.
Alice1 begins with A1 and B1, two strings each of nN
random classical bits. She then encodes these strings as
a block of nN qubits,
|Ψ1〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψa1kb1k〉
= ⊗N−1j=0 |ψa1nj+1b1nj+1〉|ψa1nj+2b1nj+2〉 · · · |ψa1nj+nb1nj+n〉,(1)
where a1k is the k
th bit of A1 (and similar for B1) and
each qubit is one of the four states
|ψ00〉 = |0〉, (2)
|ψ10〉 = |1〉, (3)
|ψ01〉 = |+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
, (4)
|ψ11〉 = |−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
. (5)
The effect of this procedure is to encode A1 in the basis
Z = {|0〉, |1〉} or X = {|+〉, |−〉}, as determined by B1.
Note that the four states are not all mutually orthogonal,
therefore no measurement can distinguish between all of
them with certainty. Alice1 then sends |Ψ1〉 to Alice2
over their public quantum communication channel.
Depending on a string A2 of nN random classical bits
which she generates, Alice2 subsequently applies a uni-
tary transformation σ0 = I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| (if the kth
bit a2k of A2 is 0), or σ1 = iσy = |0〉〈1|− |1〉〈0| (if a2k = 1)
on each |ψa1
k
b1
k
〉 of the nN qubits she receives from Al-
ice1 such that |ψa1
k
b1
k
〉 is changed into |ψ0
a2
k
b1
k
〉, and ob-
tains nN -qubit product state |Ψ20〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψ0a2
k
b1
k
〉. Af-
ter that, she performs a unitary operator I (if b2k = 0)
or H = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)〈0|+ 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)〈1| (if b2k = 1) on
each qubit state |ψ0
a2
k
b1
k
〉 according to her another random
classical bits string B2, and makes |ψ0a2
k
b1
k
〉 to be turned
into |ψa2
k
b2
k
〉. Alice2 sends Alice3 |Ψ2〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψa2kb2k〉.
Similar to Alice2, Alice3 applies quantum operations on
each qubit and sends the resulting nN qubits to Alice4.
This procedure goes on until Alicem.
Similarly, Alicem first creates two strings Am and Bm
of nN random classical bits. Then she makes a unitary
operation σ0 (if a
m
k = 0) or σ1 (if a
m
k = 1) on each
qubit state |ψam−1
k
bm−1
k
〉. It follows that |ψam−1
k
bm−1
k
〉 is
changed into |ψ0
am
k
b
m−1
k
〉. After that she applies oper-
ator I (if bmk = 0) or H (if b
m
k = 1) on the result-
ing qubit state |ψ0
am
k
b
m−1
k
〉 such that |ψ0
am
k
b
m−1
k
〉 is turned
into |ψam
k
bm
k
〉. Alicem sends N -qubit product states
|Ψm1 〉 = ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+1bmnj+1〉, |Ψm2 〉 = ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+2bmnj+2〉,
· · · , |Ψmn 〉 = ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+nbmnj+n〉 of the resulting nN -
qubit state |Ψm〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψamk bmk 〉 to Bob1, Bob2, · · · ,
Bobn, respectively.
When all Bob1, Bob2, · · · , and Bobn have announced
the receiving of their strings of N qubits, Alice1, Al-
ice2, · · · , and Alicem publicly announce the strings B1,
B2, · · · , and Bm one after another, respectively. Note
that B1, B2, · · · , and Bm reveal nothing about Ai
(i = 1, 2, · · · ,m), but it is important that all Alice1, Al-
ice2, · · · , and Alicem not publish their respective B1, B2,
· · · , and Bm until after all Bob1, Bob2, · · · , and Bobn
announce the reception of the N qubits Alicem sends to
them.
Bob1, Bob2, · · · , and Bobn then measure each qubit
of their respective strings in the basis X or Z accord-
ing to the XOR result of corresponding bits of strings
B1, B2, · · · , Bm. Since the unitary transformation
σ1 = iσy flips the states in both measuring bases such
that σ1|0〉 = −|1〉, σ1|1〉 = |0〉, σ1|+〉 = |−〉 and
σ1|−〉 = −|+〉, i.e. I, iσy leave basesX and Z unchanged,
but H turns |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |−〉 into |+〉, |−〉, |0〉 and
|1〉, respectively, i.e. H changes bases X and Z, so if
⊕mi=2bik = b2k ⊕ b3k ⊕ · · · ⊕ bmk = 0, then |ψamk bmk 〉 should be
measured in the same basis with |ψa1
k
b1
k
〉; if ⊕mi=2bik = 1,
|ψam
k
bm
k
〉 should be measured in the basis different from
|ψa1
k
b1
k
〉, where the symbol ⊕ is the addition modulo 2.
Therefore, if ⊕mi=2bik = b1k, |ψamk bmk 〉 is measured in the Z
basis, otherwise in the basisX . That is, if ⊕mi=1binj+l = 0,
then Bobl measures |ψam
nj+l
bm
nj+l
〉 in the basis Z, oth-
erwise, he measures in the basis X . Moreover, after
measurements, Bobl can extract out all Alices’s encod-
ing information ⊕mi=1ainj+l, j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, for
l = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Now all Alices and Bobs perform some tests to
determine how much noise or eavesdropping happened
during their communication. Alice1, Alice2, · · · , and
Alicem select some bits njr + l (of their nN bits) at
random, and publicly announce the selection. Here
jr ∈ {j1, j2, . . . , jr0} ⊂ {j1, j2, . . . , jr0 , jr0+1, . . . , jN} =
{0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1}, and l = 1, 2, . . . , n. All Bobs
and all Alices then publish and compare the val-
ues of these checked bits. If they find too few the
XOR results ⊕mi=1ainjr+l of the corresponding bits
ainjr+l of these checked bits of all Alices and the
values of Bobl’s checked bits |ψam
njr+l
bm
njr+l
〉 agree,
then they abort and re-try the protocol from the
start. The XOR results ⊕nl=1(⊕mi=1ainjs+l) of Bobl’s
corresponding bits ⊕mi=1ainjs+l of the rest unchecked
3bits njs + l of {⊕mi=1ainj+1}N−1j=0 , {⊕mi=1ainj+2}N−1j=0 ,
· · · , {⊕mi=1ainj+n}N−1j=0 (or ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+1bmnj+1〉,
⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+2bmnj+2〉, · · · , ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+nbmnj+n〉) can be
used as raw keys for secret sharing between all Alices
and all Bobs, where js = jr0+1, jr0+2, . . . , jN .
This protocol is summarized as follows:
M1. Alice1 chooses two random nN -bit strings A1
and B1. She encodes each data bit of A1 as {|0〉, |1〉} if
the corresponding bit of B1 is 0 or {|+〉, |−〉} if B1 is 1.
Explicitly, she encodes each data bit 0 ( 1 ) of A1 as |0〉
( |1〉 ) if the corresponding bit of B1 is 0 or |+〉 ( |−〉 )
if the corresponding bit of B1 is 1, i.e. she encodes each
bit a1k of A1 as |ψa1kb1k〉 of Eqs.(2)-(5), where b1k is the
corresponding bit of B1. Then she sends the resulting
nN -qubit state |Ψ1〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψa1kb1k〉 to Alice2.
M2. Alice2 creates two random nN -bit strings A2 and
B2. She applies σ0 or σ1 to each qubit |ψa1
k
b1
k
〉 of nN -
qubit state |Ψ1〉 according to the corresponding bit of A2
being 0 or 1, then she applies I or H to each qubit of the
resulting nN -qubit state depending on the corresponding
bit of B2 being 0 or 1. After this, she sends Alice3 the
resulting nN -qubit state |Ψ2〉.
M3. Alicei does likewise, i = 3, 4, · · · ,m − 1. De-
pending on the corresponding bit amk of a random nN -bit
string Am, which she generates on her own, Alicem per-
forms σ0 (if a
m
k = 0) or σ1 (if a
m
k = 1) on each qubit of
|Ψm−1〉. According to a random bit string Bm which she
generates, she subsequently applies I (If the correspond-
ing bit bmk of Bm is 0) or H (if b
m
k = 1) on each qubit
of the resulting nN -qubit state |Ψm0〉, which results in
nN -qubit state |Ψm〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψamk bmk 〉. After it, she sends
N -qubit state ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+lbmnj+l〉 to Bobl, 1 ≤ l ≤ n.
M4. Bob1, Bob2, · · · , Bobn receive N qubits, and
announce this fact, respectively.
M5. Alice1, Alice2, · · · , and Alicem publicly announce
the strings B1, B2, · · · , and Bm, respectively.
M6. Bob1, Bob2, · · · , and Bobn measure each qubit of
their respective strings in the basis Z or X according to
the XOR results of corresponding bits of strings B1, B2,
· · · , Bm. That is, Bobl measures |ψam
nj+lb
m
nj+l
〉 in the basis
Z (if ⊕mi=1binj+l = 0) or in the basis X (if ⊕mi=1binj+l = 1),
j = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, l = 1, 2, · · · , n.
M7. All Alices select randomly a subset that will serve
as a check on Eve’s interference, and tell all Bobs the
bits they choose. In the check procedure, all Alices and
Bobs are required to broadcast the values of their checked
bits, and compare the XOR results of the corresponding
bits of checked bits of A1, A2, · · · , Am and the values
of the corresponding bits of Bob1, Bob2, · · · , and Bobn.
If more than an acceptable number disagree, they abort
this round of operation and restart from first step.
M8. The XOR results ⊕nl=1(⊕mi=1ainjs+l) of Bobl’s
corresponding bits ⊕mi=1ainjs+l of the remaining
bits njs + l of {⊕mi=1ainj+1}N−1j=0 , {⊕mi=1ainj+2}N−1j=0 ,
· · · , {⊕mi=1ainj+n}N−1j=0 (or ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+1bmnj+1〉,
⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+2bmnj+2〉, · · · , ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+nbmnj+n〉) can be
used as key bits for secret sharing between all Alices and
all Bobs, where js = jr0+1, jr0+2, . . . , jN .
For example, m = 2 and n = 3. Suppose
A1 = {1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0}
and B1 = {0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1}
are two random 18-bit strings of Alice1. De-
pending on B1, then she encodes A1 as |Ψ1〉 =
|1〉|+〉|0〉|−〉|+〉|1〉|+〉|−〉|1〉|0〉|+〉|0〉|−〉|1〉|−〉|0〉|1〉|+〉.
If Alice2’s two strings of random bits are
A2 = {1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1} and
B2 = {1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1}, she
applies iσy to the 1
th, 2th, 3th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 12th,
14th, 15th, 18th qubits of |Ψ1〉, getting |Ψ20〉 =
|0〉|−〉|1〉|−〉|+〉|0〉|−〉|+〉|1〉|0〉|+〉|1〉|−〉|0〉|+〉|0〉|1〉|−〉,
then she performs H on 1th, 4th, 5th,
9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 18th qubits of
|Ψ20〉, obtaining |Ψ2〉 = ⊗18k=1|ψa2kb2k〉 =|+〉|−〉|1〉|1〉|0〉|0〉|−〉|+〉|−〉|+〉|0〉|−〉|−〉|0〉|+〉|+〉|1〉|1〉.
After that, she sends the 6-qubit states
|Ψ21〉 = ⊗5j=0|ψa23j+1b23j+1 〉 = |+〉|1〉|−〉|+〉|−〉|+〉,
|Ψ22〉 = ⊗5j=0|ψa23j+2b23j+2 〉 = |−〉|0〉|+〉|0〉|0〉|1〉, and
|Ψ23〉 = ⊗5j=0|ψa23j+3b23j+3 〉 = |1〉|0〉|−〉|−〉|+〉|1〉 to Bob1,
Bob2 and Bob3, respectively. When each of Bob1, Bob2
and Bob3 has received 6-qubit state and announced the
fact, Alice1 and Alice2 publicly inform all Bobs their
respective strings B1 and B2. Then Bobl measures his
qubit state |ψa23j+lb23j+l〉 in the basis Z if b13j+l⊕ b23j+l = 0
or in basis X if b13j+l ⊕ b23j+l = 1, for j = 0, 1, · · · , 5,
l = 1, 2, 3. From this, Bob1, Bob2 and Bob3 derive
Alice1 and Alice2’s encoding information {0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0},
{1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1} and {1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1} of their respective
6-qubit states if no Eve’s eavesdropping exists. If Alice1
and Alice2 choose the 1th, 2th, 3th, 13th, 14th, 15th
bits as the check bits, then the XOR results 1 ⊕ 0 ⊕ 0,
1 ⊕ 0 ⊕ 1, 0 ⊕ 0 ⊕ 1, 0 ⊕ 1 ⊕ 1 (or 1, 0, 1, 0) of the
corresponding bits of Bob1, Bob2 and Bob3’s remaining
bits {1, 1, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 1} and {0, 1, 1, 1} are used as
raw keys for secret sharing between two Alices and three
Bobs.
Note that B1, B2, · · · , and Bm reveal nothing about
Ai (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m), but it is important that all Alice1,
Alice2, · · · , and Alicem not publish their respective B1,
B2, · · · , and Bm until after all Bob1, Bob2, · · · , and
Bobn announce the reception of the N qubits Alicem
sends to them. If all Alices broadcast their respective B1,
B2, · · · , and Bm before all Bobs announce the reception
of the N qubits Alicem sends to them, then either a
(m+n+1)-th party (an ”external” eavesdropper) or the
dishonest member of two groups intercepts nN qubits
state |Ψm〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψamk bmk 〉 can learn the contents of their
(all senders) message in this procedure by measuring each
qubit in the Z basis (if ⊕mi=1binj+l = 0) or in the X basis
(if ⊕mi=1binj+l = 1).
It is necessary for Alicei (2 ≤ i ≤ m) applying uni-
tary operation H randomly on some qubits. Each sender
4Alicei encoding string Bi on the sequence of states of
qubits is to achieve the aim such that no one or part of
Alice1, · · · , Alicem can extract some information of oth-
ers. Case I: Alice2 does not encode a random string of
I and H on the sequence of single photons, Alice1 can
enforce the intercept-resend strategy to extract Alice2’s
whole information. Alice1 can intercept all the single
photons and measure them, then resend them. As the
sequence of single photons is prepared by Alice1, Alice1
knows the measuring-basis, and the original state of each
photon. She uses the same measuring-basis when she
prepared the photon to measure the photon, and read
out Alice2’s complete secret messages directly. Case II:
Alicei0 (3 ≤ i0 ≤ m) is the first one who does not encode
a random string of I andH on the sequence of single pho-
tons, then one of Alice1, Alice2, . . . , Alice(i0−1) can also
enforce the intercept-resend strategy to extract Alicei0’s
whole information by their cooperation. Without loss of
generality, suppose that Alice2 intercepts all the parti-
cles that Alicei0 sends. Alice2 can obtain Alicei0’s secret
message if Alice1, Alice3, . . . , Alice(i0 − 1) inform her
their respective strings B1, B3, . . . , Bi0−1 and A1, A3,
. . . , Ai0−1.
This secret sharing protocol between m parties and n
parties is almost 100% efficient as all the keys can be used
in the ideal case of no eavesdropping, while the quantum
secret sharing protocols with entanglement states [2] can
be at most 50% efficient in principle. In this protocol,
quantum memory is required to store the qubits which
has been shown available in the present experiment tech-
nique [16]. However, if no quantum memory is employed,
all Bobs measure their qubits before Alicei’s (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
announcement of basis, the efficiency of the present pro-
tocol falls to 50%.
Two groups can also realize secret sharing by Alice1
preparing a sequence of nN polarized single photons
such that the n-qubit product state of each n photons
is in the basis Z or X as determined by N -bit string
B1, instead that in the above protocol. For instance,
(A) Alicei (1 ≤ i ≤ m) creates a random nN -bit
string Ai and a random N -bit string Bi, and Alice1
encodes her two strings as a block of nN qubits state
|Φ1〉 = ⊗Nj=1|φa1
n(j−1)+1
b1
j
〉|φa1
n(j−1)+2
b1
j
〉 · · · |φa1
n(j−1)+n
b1
j
〉,
where each qubit state |φa1
n(j−1)+l
b1
j
〉 is one of |φ00〉 = |0〉,
|φ10〉 = |1〉, |φ01〉 = |+〉 and |φ11〉 = |−〉. Then
Alice1 sends |Φ1〉 to Alice2. Alicei (2 ≤ i ≤ m)
applies σ0 or σ1 to each qubit state |φai−1
n(j−1)+l
b
i−1
j
〉
(1 ≤ l ≤ n) according to the corresponding bit
ai
n(j−1)+l of A2 being 0 or 1, then she applies I (if
bij = 0) or H (if b
i
j = 1) to each resulting qubit state
|φ0
ai
n(j−1)+l
bi
j
〉. Alicem sends N qubits ⊗Nj=1|φamn(j−1)+lbmj 〉
of the resulting nN qubits state |Φm〉 =
⊗Nj=1|φamn(j−1)+1bmj 〉|φamn(j−1)+2bmj 〉 · · · |φamn(j−1)+nbmj 〉 to
Bobl, 1 ≤ l ≤ n. After all Bobs receive their re-
spective N qubits, Alicei announces Bi, then Bobl
measures each of his qubit states |φam
n(j−1)+l
bm
j
〉 in
the basis Z if ⊕mi=1bij = 0 or X if ⊕mi=1bij = 1, and
deduces its value ⊕mi=1ain(j−1)+l if there is no Eve’s
eavesdropping. A subset of {⊕nl=1(⊕mi=1ain(j−1)+l)}Nj=1
will serve as a check, passing the test, the unchecked
bits of {⊕nl=1(⊕mi=1ain(j−1)+l)}Nj=1 will take as the
raw keys for secret sharing between two groups. (B)
Alicei chooses two random N -bit strings Ai and
Bi, and Alice1 prepares a block of nN qubits state
|Ψ1〉 = ⊗Nj=1|ψa1j1b1j 〉|ψa1j2b1j 〉 · · · |ψa1jnb1j 〉, where a1jl is 0
or 1 and ⊕nl=1a1jl = a1j . Alicei applies unitary operation
σ0 or σ1 to each qubit state |ψai−1
jl
b
i−1
j
〉 depending
on the j-th bit aij of Ai being 0 or 1, following it, I
or H according to Bi, to each particle. Bobl mea-
sures each of his particles |ψam
jl
bm
j
〉 in the basis Z (if
⊕mi=1bij = 0) or X (if ⊕mi=1bij = 1). All Alices select
randomly some bits and announce their selection.
All Bobs and all Alices compare the values of these
check bits. If the test passes, then the rest of the
unchecked bits of {⊕nl=1(a1jl ⊕ a2j ⊕ · · · ⊕ amj )}Nj=1 are
the raw key for secret sharing between two groups. We
should emphasize that n must be odd in case (B) since
⊕nl=1(a1jl ⊕ a2j ⊕ · · · ⊕ amj ) = a1j ⊕ na2j ⊕ · · · ⊕ namj = a1j if
n is even.
III. SECURITY
Now we discuss the unconditional security of this quan-
tum secret sharing protocol between m parties and n
parties. Note that the encoding of secret messages by
Alicei (1 ≤ i ≤ m) is identical to the process in a one-
time-pad encryption where the text is encrypted with a
random key as the state of the photon in the protocol is
completely random. The great feature of a one-time-pad
encryption is that as long as the key strings are truly se-
cret, it is completely safe and no secret messages can be
leaked even if the cipher-text is intercepted by the eaves-
dropper. Here the secret sharing protocol is even more
secure than the classical one-time-pad in the sense that
an eavesdropper Eve can not intercept the whole cipher-
text as the photons’ measuring-basis is chosen randomly.
Thus the security of this secret sharing protocol depends
entirely on the second part when Alicem sends the l-th
sequence of N photons to Bobl (1 ≤ l ≤ n).
The process for ensuring a secure block of nN qubits
(n secure sequences of N photons) is similar to that in
the BB84 QKD protocol [17]. The process of this secret
sharing between m parties and n parties after all Alices
encoding their respective messages using unitary opera-
tions is in fact identical to n independent BB84 QKD
processes, which has been proven unconditional secure
[18, 19]. Thus the security for the present quantum secret
sharing between multi-party and multi-party is guaran-
teed.
In practice, some qubits may be lost in transmitting.
In this case, all Alices and Bobs can take two kind
5strategies, one is removing these qubits, the other is
using a qubit chosen at random in one of four states
{|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} as a substitute for a lost qubit. If a
member does not receive a qubit and wants to delete it,
she/he must announce and let all members in the two
groups know the fact. All Alices and all Bobs sacrifice
some randomly selected qubits to test the ”error rate”.
If the error rate is too high, they abort the protocol.
Otherwise, by utilizing a Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS)
code [18, 20, 21], they perform information reconciliation
and privacy amplification on the remaining bits to obtain
secure final key bits for secret sharing. They proceed
to this step obtaining the final key while all Alices
communicate with all Bobs. In a CSS mode, classical
linear codes C1 and C
⊥
2 are used for bit and phase
error correction, respectively, where C2 ⊂ C1. The best
codes that we know exist satisfy the quantum Gilbert-
Varshamov bound. The number of cosets of C2 in C1 is
|C1|/|C2| = 2M so there is a one-to-one correspondence
uK → K of the set of representatives uK of the 2M cosets
of C2 in C1 and the set of M-bit strings K. As in the
BB84 protocol, C1 is used to correct bit errors in the key,
and C2 to amplify privacy. For the sake of convenience,
we suppose that after verification test all Alices are
left with the N ′ bit string v = {⊕nl=1(⊕mi=1ain+l),
⊕nl=1(⊕mi=1ai2n+l), · · · ,⊕nl=1(⊕mi=1ainN ′+l)} =
{⊕nl=1(⊕mi=1ains+l)}N
′
s=1, but all Bobs with v + ǫ by
the effect of losses and noise. Let us assume that a priori
it is known that along the communication channel used
by all Alices and all Bobs, the expected number of errors
per block caused by losses and all noise sources including
eavesdropping is less than t = δN ′, where δ is the bit
error rate. How can an upper bound be placed on t? In
practice, this can be established by random testing of the
channel, leaving us with a protocol which is secure [22],
even against collective attacks. If δ is low enough, we can
be confident that error correction will succeed, so that
all Alices and all Bobs share a secure common key. The
secure final key for secret sharing can be extracted from
the raw key bits (consisting of the remaining noncheck
bits) at the asymptotic rate R = Max{1−2H(δ), 0} [22],
where δ is the bit error rate found in the verification
test (assuming δ < 1/2). Using a pre-determined t
error-correcting CSS code [18], the two groups share
a secret key string and realize secure communication.
Suppose that government department1 wishes to send
messages to government department2, then all Alices
gather together, choose a random code word u in C1 (u
may be u1 + u2 + · · · + um, where ui is a code word in
C1 selected randomly by Alicei), and encode their M -bit
message P by adding the message and the M -bit string
K together, where u + C2 = uK + C2, then they send
it to government department2. Bobs receive the secret
message and publicly announce this fact. All Alices
announce u+ v. All Bobs subtract this from their result
v+ ǫ, and correct the result u+ ǫ with code C1 to obtain
the code word u. All Alices and all Bobs use the M -bit
string K as the final key for secret sharing. That is, all
Alices and all Bobs perform information reconciliation
by the use of the classical code C1, and performs privacy
amplification by computing the coset of u+C2. All Bobs
can decode and read out the message P by subtracting
K. No one in department1 tells final key K to someone
or part of department2, since the aim of all Alice is to
let all Bobs know their message.
In summary, we propose a scheme for quantum secret
sharing between multi-party and multi-party, where no
entanglement is employed. In the protocol, Alice1 pre-
pares a sequence of single photons in one of four different
states according to her two random bits strings, other
Alicei (2 ≤ i ≤ m) directly encodes her two random
classical information strings on the resulting sequence
of Alice(i − 1) via unitary operations, after that Alicem
sends 1/n of the sequence of single photons to each Bobl
(1 ≤ l ≤ n). Each Bobl measures his photons according
to all Alices’ measuring-basis sequences. All Bobs must
cooperate in order to infer the secret key shared by all
Alices. Any subset of all Alices or all Bobs can not ex-
tract secret information, but the entire set of all Alices
and the entire set of all Bobs can. As entanglement, espe-
cially the inaccessible multi-party entangled state, is not
necessary in the present quantum secret sharing protocol
between m-party and n-party, it may be more applicable
when the numbers m and n of the parties of secret shar-
ing are large. Its theoretic efficiency is also doubled to
approach 100%. This protocol is feasible with present-
day techniques.
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